Although prohibited since the 1970s, insider dealing has only become a crime in Hong Kong since 2002. After briefly discussing the reasons for and against the prohibition of insider dealing, this paper outlines the legislative history of the regulatory mechanism for insider dealing in Hong Kong, and critically analyses the current regulatory regime. This paper argues that the law should be made simpler, fairer, and to conform better to basic civil liberty.
Introduction
Insider dealing can be generally defined as dealing on material, non-public (i.e., inside) information about a company by insiders for personal gain. Tipping, the disclosure of inside information to others by insiders, also falls under the concept. Although it is a widely recognized form of market misconduct, and is regulated in all of the major financial markets 2 , scholars and regulators differ on whether, how, and why insider dealing should be regulated.
This paper discusses the legal regulation of insider dealing in Hong Kong. It:
 critically examines the rationales for regulating insider dealing,  introduces the regulatory mechanism for insider dealing in Hong Kong,  discusses issues arising from implementation of the mechanism, with an emphasis on constitutional issues, and  makes recommendations for improvement.
Arguments for and against prohibition Arguments for prohibition
The local authority and the judiciary have provided several reasons for regulating insider dealing, but usually with little elaboration. Here we examine the suggested reasons critically with the help of overseas jurisprudence 3 .
Insider dealing is a kind of fraud 4 .
In common parlance, fraud is usually associated with active misrepresentation, such as when a fraudster claims that he can cure people of terminal cancer for a huge fee.
Insider dealing typically takes place on impersonal exchanges. The insider does not make any misrepresentation to his counterparty. How is insider dealing fraudulent?
The courts in the United States have for decades struggled with the problem of applying a general anti-fraud rule to combat insider dealing 5 , and have in different times adopted different theories of how insider dealing is fraudulent. In gist, the problem is that mere unfairness in itself is seen as insufficient in rendering insider dealing fraudulent; something more is required. Its latest theory, the misappropriation theory, posits that a fiduciary duty exists between people who are given privileged access to inside information and the source of the information. Secret dealing for personal gain represents dishonest misappropriation of that information by the fiduciary from his principal, as he deprives him of his right to exclusive use of that information. This makes the conduct fraudulent 6 .
Additionally, the United Kingdom's Fraud Act 2006 provides a sophisticated definition of fraud. The relevant sections of the Act create criminal liability if a person dishonestly, and for the purpose of personal gain:
1. makes false representation, 2. fails to disclose information to another where he is under a legal duty to disclose, or 6 3. abuses a position of trust.
In Hong Kong, officers of listed corporations are now required by statute to disclose inside information as soon as reasonably practicable, and non-disclosure is only accepted for defined purposes 7 . On top of this, the presence of insider dealing prohibition means that insiders clearly have a legal duty to disclose any inside information to his counterparty or abstain from dealing. Additionally, employees and professionals generally occupy a position of trust in relation to their employers and clients, and any secret misuse of information gained in dealing for personal profit breaches that trust. Hence, in the present context, insider dealing falls squarely under the concept of fraud.
Insider dealing is not a victimless crime 8 .
Market participants as victim
A major argument against considering those who sold / bought from insider dealer as victims is that they would have sold / bought at that price anyway. The Court of First Instance, in Chan Pak Hoe Pablo 9 , quoting R v McQuoid 10 , rebuts this by arguing that if that party had access to the information, he would not have traded at that price.
Using the common law language of causation, but for the insider's failure to disclose, the counterparty would not have traded. The problem with this explanation is that it applies equally well to all those who traded on that securities contemporaneously when the prohibited trade took place, making the potential list of 'victims' undeterminable, and the insiders' potential liabilities unduly large. Since victims in the market usually would not even know they have been victimized, they are not in a position to take action to protect their rights, unless the culprit is identified by a regulatory body. This justifies central regulation of insider dealing.
Transaction counterparty as victim

Issuer as victim
As the misappropriation theory shows, the issuer of the securities, who grants access to its confidential information in confidence to its fiduciaries, has its confidential information misappropriated from it in insider dealing. It is also a victim of insider dealing. That it is bound by disclosure rules, and could not have profited the way the insider did does not detract from the fact that they are wronged by the insider. Often, it also suffers reputational loss. Moreover, the corporation's cost of capital may rises as investors could be less willing to invest in corporations whose insiders collect much of the expected gain through insider dealing.
The lack of any effective way in which corporations can monitor and prevent fiduciaries from dealing on inside information adds to the need for government regulation.
Insider dealing is unfair. It undermines confidence in the integrity of the market.
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This has been identified as the chief mischief the local law addresses 14 . If an exchange allows insider dealing, insider dealers' informational advantage would allow them to consistently profit from other market players. This is akin to gambling using loaded dice. This not only raises moral issues, but also deters participants from entering the market. This decreases liquidity in the market and weakens its ability in performing its essential functions, such as resource allocation and price discovery. This has attracted attacks from many sides. First, even if insider dealing is unregulated so that insiders do not have to hide their identities from law enforcers, insiders would often have incentive to hide their identities so as to rip more of the profit themselves. Hence, the signaling effect is weak. And, in most cases the information would anyway be disclosed fully shortly, hence the gain in market efficiency through insider dealing's imprecise signaling function is minimal.
Arguments against prohibition
The second argument Manne advances is that insider dealing is an efficient way to recompense company managers. However, the market is inherently unpredictable.
Managers would not be able to foresee what their reward will be. Also, the free-rider problem is hard to solve, as the typist who contributed minimally may be as well placed as the executives to profit through insider dealing. Moreover, this also provides perverse incentives for corporate managers to manipulate corporate endeavors for personal trading gains.
Conclusion
On balance, the case for regulating insider dealing is much stronger than the case against it. Where insiders' duty to disclose or abstain from trading with inside information is established, any insider dealing in breach of such rule, or other fiduciary duties, is a form of fraud. Insider dealing generates specific, but unidentifiable trade victims, and harms the securities issuers' interest. The market as a whole also losses as investors shun the unfair market. -pay a penalty of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided, and -pay the government's expense in relation to the inquiry.
The regulatory mechanism in Hong Kong
The current mechanism
A number of legislations regulating the financial markets were passed in the 1990s.
The Securities and Futures Ordinance 24 , enacted in 2002, consolidated the various ordinances and instituted major regulatory reforms. The SFO, as amended from time to time, is the current regime in force.
The S(ID)O was regarded as effective in dealing with insider dealing, hence its provisions were largely reenacted in the SFO. However, to bring insider dealing in line with other market misconducts, insider dealing becomes a criminal offence punishable by a maximum penalty of $10,000,000 fine and 10 years' imprisonment 25 .
The rest of this chapter outlines the current regime. 
Core concepts
B. Person connection
To engage insider dealing liability, a personal nexus must exist between the person and the corporation in which he has inside information. They fall into three groups 30 :
Connected persons 31
This comprises five sub-groups:
i. 
Take-over bidders 39
These are persons contemplating or have contemplated making a take-over offer 40 for the corporation. (2) 40 See Sch1 for definition.
Tippees 41
These are persons who knowingly received inside information from insiders 42 . 
Disclosing
Connected persons and take-over bidders, but not tippees, are prohibited from disclosing inside information to others, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that he will use it for the purpose of 'dealing', or 'counseling or procuring'.
Overseas prohibition 47
All three groups are prohibited from 'counseling or procuring' or 'disclosing' in relation to overseas markets.
Exceptions and defenses
The legislation provides several exceptions and defenses (safe harbors) for legitimate activities that would otherwise be caught under the prohibition. These allow, for example, underwriters to perform their functions in good faith 48 .
41 s270(1)(e),(f) & 291 (5), (6) 42 See legislation for mens rea requirements. 1. whether market misconduct has taken place, 2. the identity of person engaged, and 3. the amount of profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the misconduct.
The applicable standard of proof caused some confusion in the past. In Koon Wing Yee 61 , the CFA clarified that, in civil matters, the standard remains one of 'balance of probability' even in serious cases, which means that the tribunal should consider that the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. But the tribunal should also be mindful that allegations that are more serious in nature are less likely to have occurred, and hence more cogent evidence is needed to establish the allegation on the balance of probability.
Penalties
Due to human rights concern, the MMT cannot impose high fines (unlike the IDT in S(ID)O, which can impose fines up to 3 times of the amount of the illicit gain referral order is also available, whereby the Tribunal gives notice to a relevant body to consider taking disciplinary action against persons identified.
Furthermore, the MMT has expanded power to make:
1. Disqualification order: disqualify those found guilty of market misconduct from a broader range of positions for up to 5 years;
2. Cold shoulder order: Prohibit the person from dealing in securities and financial products for up to 5 years;
3. Cease and desist order: Order the person not to engage in specified form of market misconduct.
Criminal route
The SFO empowers the SFC to summarily prosecute market misconduct offences on its own 63 . On summary conviction, the market misconduct offences (including insider dealing) are punishable by a maximum of $1,000,000 fine and 3 years' imprisonment, instead of $10,000,000 fine and 10 years' imprisonment on conviction on indictment.
The decision to prosecute cases as indictable offences is made by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Normally, this decision is made based on an assessment of the likely sentence if the defendant is convicted 64 .
Aside from imposition of fine and terms of imprisonment, the court may, upon convicting the person of market misconducts, make disqualification order, cold shoulder order, and disciplinary referral order 65 .
Other proceedings
Over-emphasis on the 'dual regime' may give the misimpression that insider dealers only face proceeding in either the MMT or the criminal courts. In fact, insider dealers may also face the below listed proceedings in conjunction with the dual regime.
Disciplinary action
The SFC regulates the operation of the securities and futures market through a 
Prosecutions in the MMT
Relatively fewer cases have been heard in the MMT. In all, it has submitted completed reports on eight cases (five of which relates to insider dealing) since it commenced the first proceeding in 2007 90 . One other insider dealing case is currently being heard.
Does MMT deal only with cases at the lower end of culpability?
In 92 Above 66, [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] activities.
In another case 93 involving an elaborate plot to cover up the true identity of the takeover bidder, the MMT held that a takeover bidder perpetrated insider dealing by knowingly disclosing inside information about the bid to another person. That person made an illicit gain of over $1,600,000 through dealing on that information not for the purpose of the bid.
These two cases involved insider dealing perpetrated by experienced market players central to the operation of financial markets, and involved large sums of money. Although the parties stood to gain only indirectly through the dealings, the severity of these cases does not seem to be lower than the Sino Gold case discussed above, where an employee was criminally convicted for having avoided a loss of $60,000 through insider dealing.
The suggestion that the MMT only deals with less serious cases is at variance with the legislative materials, where the justifications for establishing the IDT and the MMT have always been the need to make prosecution of insider dealing cases easier through more relaxed standard of proof and rules of evidence (see chapter 3).
In response to the author's enquiry, the SFC stated that: 
Constitutional and administrative law concerns
Nature of proceedings in the MMT -civil or criminal?
The propriety of arming the IDT with substantial sanctioning power, stopping just short of criminalization, so that the accused may be deprived of civil liberty safeguards available in criminal courts was seriously doubted in the bill stage of the S(ID)O 95 . This issue also featured prominently in the legislative process of the SFO.
Whether the use of compelled evidence contravenes the right against self-incrimination received special attention 96 . This is partly addressed by the provision that evidence given in MMT proceedings is not admissible in other proceedings, save in some confined situations 97 .
There were also serious uncertainties about whether the courts would view the MMT as deciding 'criminal' guilt, thereby engaging a higher standard of proof for the prosecution, and the defendants' right against self-incrimination as provided for in the Bill of Rights 98 . To avoid this, the MMT was not given the power to impose high fines, a power the IDT possessed. Additional penalties in the form of 'cease and desist' and 'cold shoulder' orders were added to beef up the MMT's sanctioning power as a consequence 99 .
Koon Wing Yee
The courts have since made determinations on some of these issues. In Koon 100 , the CFA was asked to decide whether the IDT's proceedings involve the determination of 'criminal charge' because of its power to impose fine or to order disqualification.
Relying on the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence on materially the same provisions, the court held that three criteria determined whether a charge is ' On the nature of the offence, the court held that insider dealing undoubtedly amounted to very serious misconduct. Its dishonest nature, and the fact that it was criminalized in the SFO, was considered, as was the fact that the provisions apply to the public generally, not to a limited group of persons. These factors suggested that the charge is criminal in nature.
As for civil characteristics, it was suggested that there are the absences of:
1. a formal charge, 2. conviction constituting criminal record, and 3. provision for imprisonment.
The first two characteristics were discounted by the court, arguing that protection of fundamental rights must be grounded on matters of substance, not form.
Following the United Kingdom's decisions, the CFA held that the third factor, the nature and severity of the potential sanction, was the most important. Disqualification order was viewed as primarily protective, with any deterrent effect being merely incidental, and does not make proceedings criminal in character.
On the other hand, the court viewed that the amount of financial penalty, which can be up to treble the amount not only of the gain that the insider dealer derived personally, but also those gained by anyone else as a result of the insider dealing, as substantial, and amounted to punishment for serious misconduct. IDT proceedings were thus held to involve determination of criminal charge.
As the proceedings are criminal in nature, the use of compelled evidence amounted to a breach of the right to silence. The court rejected the argument that the difficulty in proving insider dealing provided justification for derogating from the privilege against self-incrimination, since the compelled answers to questions went to the core of a case of insider dealing, and constitute a complete abrogation of the right, even though the right is of a derogable nature.
In the end, the court held that by striking out the financial penalty provision, thereby removing the reason for characterizing the proceedings as criminal, the proceedings can be restored to its intended 'civil' character. The overall regime thus remained largely unscathed.
It is notable that the nature of the offence was held to be of a "very serious and dishonest nature 102 ", and "can be readily characterized as criminal conduct" 103 . This suggests that any significant penalty would likely tip the balance and make the overall proceeding 'criminal'. This is of relevance in examining the MMT regime.
Chau Chin Hung
104
In Chau, proceedings of the MMT were challenged on largely the same grounds. This being a CFI judgment, the approach in Koon was followed. The new orders available to the MMT (i.e. 'cease and desist', and 'cold shoulder' orders) were held to serve the same essentially protective purpose as disqualification order in the IDT, and thus are deemed unproblematic.
As for monetary fine, unlike the IDT, the MMT does not have the power to impose high fines. It can order disgorgement of profit only. The court held that the disgorgement order is grounded on the idea that perpetrators of infractions should not be allowed to retain their ill-gotten gain 105 , and is not penal in character. The fact that the penalty was paid to the government, and the person may still be liable to pay additional compensation to victims was dismissed by the court, citing rather unconvincingly as the reason that the two consequences should be viewed as separate and ought not be mixed 106 .
As for the power to make cost awards (for cost and expenses incurred by the Government and the SFC in relation to the proceeding), the court brusquely held that it is compensatory in nature in a two-lined paragraph, equating it with civil courts' power to make costs award 107 . This is highly questionable.
The power to make cost order was first given to the IDT in the S(ID)O. In exercising this power, the IDT expressly pointed out that the cost regime cannot be equated with the regime for civil cases, which is compensatory in character between private litigants. The tribunal found it debatable to what extent the state should be recompensed for prosecuting its citizens, and pointed out that there is no standard rule in criminal cases that persons convicted should pay prosecution's cost, as this poses the danger of pressuring persons charged not to contest the charges 108 .
In fact, whether high cost order will be considered 'punitive' had raised legislators' concern at the bill stage 109 . Their concerns were assuaged, inter alia, by the fact that such costs had been maintained at a reasonable magnitude in the IDT (the highest amount awarded in the three-year-period before 2001 was $260,000) 110 .
This is no longer the case. Cost orders imposed by the MMT are often of crippling magnitude. For example, a trainee solicitor who tipped off her then-lover and together made notional profits of about $74,000 were ordered to pay $1,160,000 in costs (15 times the total notional profit), while her then-lover was ordered to pay $642,000 in costs, as well as to disgorge the notional profit 111 . The severity of the order is compounded by the fact that the trainee solicitor was likely to be of limited means, as the facts showed that she relied on her then-lover's loan (totaling just $115,000) to complete her legal qualification course shortly before committing the offence 112 .
Prohibitively high cost order is the norm, not the exception in the MMT. In fact, in the eight MMT reports completed thus far, only in one other case had cost order of a lesser amount been made 113 .
The judgment in Chau had failed to engage with these considerations. While the case was appealed to the CA 114 , these above issues were not discussed. The question of cost order has yet to be considered by the CFA. Further judicial consideration on this seems inevitable. As discussed, given the serious nature of the offence, it seems likely that the highly punitive cost order would be found to make the overall proceeding 'criminal', and, like the IDT's financial penalty, need to be struck out. 
Lack of impartiality
The IDT, and the MMT, sits as a panel that comprises a judge and two lay members.
The members are appointed at the sole discretion of the Chief Executive. At the bill stage of the SFO, suggestions were made that a panel of members be established. This was rejected as the Government believed it is more important to retain the flexibility to appoint members with the necessary expertise in any given case. This lack of safeguard to ensure the independence of members has attracted academic criticism, as the members may be tainted by commercial interest and other influences 115 .
The concern is not without foundation. In Cheung 116 , it was held that a lay member has 'probably' committed a criminal form of misconduct through improper disclosure of confidential materials, and making false representation to the tribunal about the nature of his relationship with one of the accused 117 . The CA, however, held that as the breaches first occurred when the hearing had almost concluded, and it was not
shown that the member did not participate properly in the deliberation process, the tribunal's decision was safe.
In another case concerning Koon Wing Yee 118 , the impartiality of the IDT was challenged on a structural level. The applicant argued that since the executive branch of the government controlled most aspects of an IDT inquiry, and an inquisitorial approach allowing the use of compelled evidence is used, which ultimately result in a finding where money is paid to the government, the overall process lacked impartiality.
The CFA held that the design of the IDT has sufficient features that enhanced its independence. These include that a judge chairs the tribunal, and the rights of subjects to be heard and be represented. Importantly, the court pointed out that appeal to the CA is integral to the scheme. This thus makes good any potential deficiencies in the right to fair hearing. 
Make if fairer
As the CFA held in Koon 125 , the structure of the MMT is largely satisfactory regarding its impartiality. However, the behavior of ordinary member has caused some difficulties. This problem can be addressed through, as in the United Kingdom's Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (which performs largely the same functions as the MMT), using legally-qualified persons with significant experience as members 126 ; or, as suggested in the bill stage, using a panel of designated members with pre-screening. Specific expertise can be obtained through appointment of experts in trials.
Respect civil liberty
As the above chapter on the challenges regarding the constitutionality of MMT proceedings shows, even if the overall procedure does not technically constituted breach of fundamental rights, it come dangerous close to. The overall arrangement does not conform in spirit to the 'generous interpretation' our highest court say it gives to provisions protecting fundamental rights 127 .
Stop the use of compelled evidence in the MMT
Confronted with essentially the same problem, the British authority demonstrated that they take fundamental rights more seriously. This step should also be taken in Hong Kong. The MMT should stop using compelled evidence. For purely disciplinary actions, which are more clearly regulatory in nature, compelled evidence may be justified. Hence, while the SFC may not use such evidence in MMT proceedings, they can use it to discipline regulated persons, thus its ability to protect the market would not be significantly reduced even if these were banned in the MMT.
Abolish or reform the cost order
Another issue is the standard of proof. The CFA in Koon 130 held that the BORO requires the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to be applied when the proceedings involve a determination of criminal charge. Aside from the harsh cost order, which ought to be abolished (or its use be sufficiently constrained), other elements of the MMT regime has been examined by the CFA to be civil in character and are in conformity with human rights requirement. Thus, with the abolition of the use of compelled evidence and cost order, the regime would be brought back to a right-respecting 'middle-ground' in the civil-criminal continuum it was designed to operate in. Additionally, as the balance of probability standard in itself takes into account the seriousness of the conduct, this goes some way to justify the use of such a standard where the proceedings have a mixed, 'middle-ground' character.
Abolish the MTT?
Alternatively, the abolition of the MMT might be considered. As we have seen, its introduction was mainly justified on the insurmountable difficulties of proving market misconducts in the criminal courts. In relation to insider dealing, the data do not support that claim. In fact, more cases have been successfully prosecuted in the criminal courts than in the MMT. Without considering other market misconducts, we cannot fully appraise the utility of the MMT here. However, the data do suggest that the institutional value of the MMT should be reassessed.
Consider alternative enforcement
The recent amendment to the SFO that put the obligation of corporations to make timely disclosure of inside information on a statutory footing is relevant to the regulation of insider dealing 131 . Insider dealing is of value when insiders possess 129 Please refer to above 120, Cap14
130 Above 60 inside information. If the timely disclosure of inside information is strictly enforced, the opportunities for insider dealing greatly diminish.
Insider dealing is an insidious crime, with difficult-to-proof mens rea requirements.
Non-disclosure is different. Once knowledge of inside information, which can be readily inferred from the situation, is proved, the liability is strict, unless corporation officers can point to certain defined defenses.
Hence, if the amendments suggested above diminish the regulatory effectiveness of the SFC in any way, it can be offset by focusing resources onto to ensuring that disclosure obligations are conscientiously met. As such contraventions are easily detected and proved, the probability of getting caught is high, regular enforcement could hope to achieve a good deterrent effect. This might prove more effective than preventing insider dealing through prosecuting insider dealers, where the difficulties of detection and prosecution, especially when tippees are used, are much higher 132 .
Conclusion
The prohibition of insider dealing in Hong Kong is regularly enforced, with the courts increasingly willing to impose deterring sentences. The legal regime can be made simpler, fairer, and to conform better to fundamental rights. Suitable changes are suggested.
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